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THE AIR WE ALL BREATHE:
INTERNET BANS IN PROBATION
CONDITIONS— DALTON V. STATE
Kristen M. Renberg, PhD* and Angela Sbano**
ABSTRACT
In today’s world, the Internet is synonymous with opportunity. Recently, the
Supreme Court has even recognized a First Amendment right to access the
Internet. However, it is still common practice to assign the special conditions
of Internet bans or restrictions for individuals on parole or supervised release.
Courts have split on how to strike a balance between the goal of deterrence and
protection of an individual’s rights. The Court of Appeals of Alaska weighed
into this ongoing debate in Dalton v. State, by holding that a restriction
requiring prior approval from a parole officer before any and all Internet use
was unconstitutionally broad. This decision marked a departure from
precedent, and a general recognition that the Internet has become an
indispensable part of living in, and importantly, successfully reentering society
today.

I. INTRODUCTION
Now more than ever, Internet access is a lifeline—not a luxury. In
Dalton v. State, the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that a special
condition of release requiring parole officer approval before the parolee
may access the Internet was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.1 In its holding, the court quoted the parolee’s own plea
against the condition, that the Internet “is ‘the air that we all breathe
now.’”2 This Comment addresses a growing disagreement among
jurisdictions, with some identifying total Internet bans as a justified
condition for parole or probation. At the crux of this disagreement are
tens of thousands of supervised individuals who seek reintegration into
society. This Comment argues that, in this modern era, banning a parolee
Copyright © 2021 by Kristen M. Renberg and Angela Sbano.
* Ph.D. in Political Science, Duke University, 2020; J.D. Candidate, Duke
University School of Law, 2022.
** J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2022. 1. Dalton v. State, 477
P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
2. Id. at 656.
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from the Internet suffocates their ability to integrate back into society,
essentially taking away the air that we all breathe.
This Comment reviews the ways in which different jurisdictions
have approached Internet restrictions within probation and parole
conditions and the impact of access to the Internet for reintegration
generally. Part II reviews the history of restricting Internet access as a
parole or probation condition and the case law concerning this issue. Part
III details the Court of Appeals of Alaska’s recent decision in Dalton v.
State. Next, Part IV provides an analysis of the court’s decision while also
comparing and contrasting the decision with other jurisdictions’
approaches to the issue of total Internet bans in parole and probation
conditions. Finally, Part V discusses how the Internet has become
indispensable for meaningful social interaction and a crucial part of
reintegrating into society after incarceration.

II. BACKGROUND
Today, roughly four million people in the United States live under
some form of parole, supervised release,3 probation, or community
supervision program, including one in sixty-six Alaskan citizens.4 For
tens of thousands of these people, one of the special conditions of release
from imprisonment is some kind of restriction of their use of the Internet
or social media.5 The review of these conditions requires a balancing act
by the courts. On the one hand, there is a desire to deter the kind of
activity that led to the crime, and on the other, there is a need to protect
the defendant’s constitutional rights, particularly to free speech and due
process. This balance is especially difficult in light of the goals of
probation and supervised release programs: rehabilitation and
reintegration. While the purpose of incarceration can include both
rehabilitation and punishment, probation and parole are intended to
focus primarily on rehabilitation and deterrence.6 These goals may
conflict in the context of Internet restrictions as special conditions of
3. The term parole usually describes a conditioned release under state law
instead of imprisonment, whereas supervised release describes the same situation
under federal law. Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for
Individuals on Supervision for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663,
668 (2019). The terms should be read as synonymous for purposes of this
comment, as the constitutionality of Internet restrictions implicates both state and
federal criminal justice systems.
4. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARIEL ALPER, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017-2018 1 (2020); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 6
(2018).
5. Hutt, supra note 3, at 665.
6. Id. at 672–73.

38.1 RENBERG-SBANO (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

5/11/2021 10:40 PM

INTERNET BANS IN PROBATION CONDITIONS

173

release. As technology becomes increasingly necessary for political
engagement, commerce, employment, and social connection, an Internet
restriction designed to prevent recidivism may also prevent the
alternative goal of societal reentry.7
Restrictions on the use of computers and access to the Internet as a
condition of supervised release or parole began in the first half of the
1990s.8 While Internet restrictions are not tied exclusively to sexuallybased offenses,9 Internet and social media restrictions have most
commonly been applied to this category of offenses in recent years.10
As courts began using Internet restrictions as special conditions for
parole and probation, they also began to develop jurisprudence to assess
these conditions’ constitutionality. Restrictions on Internet access have
been reviewed in a manner similar to other special conditions for parole
or supervised release. This review centers around: (1) the relatedness of
the restriction to the offense and (2) whether the condition is more
restrictive than necessary for the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring
deterrence and facilitating rehabilitation.11
The balance of tailoring Internet restrictions has changed over the
last twenty years, reflecting the Internet’s ever-growing importance to
everyday life. The United States Supreme Court formally recognized this
shift in Packingham v. North Carolina.12 The Court considered a North
Carolina statute making it a felony for registered sex offenders to engage
on social media platforms that allowed minors to make accounts on that
website.13 The statute was held to be in violation of the First
Amendment.14 While the Court recognized the valid government interest
in protecting children and sexual assault victims from further abuse, it
found the statute was still too broad to survive even intermediate
scrutiny.15 It held that the statute placed a broader burden on speech than

7. Id. at 665–66.
8. See generally United States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561 (11th Cir. 1992); State v.
Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
9. See generally United States v. Keller, 366 F. App’x 362 (3d Cir. 2010)
(banning a defendant’s use of Internet to create business websites for three years
after conviction of ten counts of mail fraud); United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d
1346 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (regarding Internet restrictions in relation to identity theft
and drug trafficking).
10. See Hutt, supra note 3, at 665, 670 (noting that the majority of Internet and
social media bans are tied to sex offenses, and that these types of restrictions “have
proliferated over the last few years, often outpacing” legislative regulation).
11. United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2021); United States
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).
12. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
13. Id. at 1733.
14. Id. at 1736.
15. Id. at 1736–37.
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was necessary to meet its legitimate policy goals.16 The Court reasoned
that the statute prohibiting all presence on any social media would forbid
otherwise protected kinds of speech.17 Importantly, the Court’s holding
established a constitutional right to an online presence, noting that
although “in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today
the answer is clear. It is cyberspace . . . and social media in particular.”18
This part of the Court’s holding reflects the reality that access to the
Internet has become as indispensable to free speech as air is to breathing.
Courts have interpreted Packingham’s impact differently in the few
years since its publication, particularly as to whether it extends to special
conditions for parole or supervised release.19 However, it is clear that
there is an established constitutional protection over the ability to engage
online. While it is uncontested that individuals on probation, supervised
release, or parole may have their rights limited to a degree, the extent to
which a restriction maintains constitutionality was the subject of Dalton.

III. DALTON V. STATE
In June 2017, Kevin Dalton sexually assaulted his twelve-year-old
stepdaughter.20 The assault was immediately reported and investigated.21
Pursuant to a search warrant, the police searched Dalton’s iPad and
discovered multiple visits to a pornography website in the seventy-two
hours preceding the abuse, where Dalton viewed content that closely
resembled the assault, such as sex acts between stepfathers and
stepdaughters.22
Dalton was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of
a minor.23 He later plead guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a single
reduced charge of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.24 The plea
agreement left the length and terms of Dalton’s sentence to the discretion
of the trial court.25 The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years, ten
16. Id. at 1736.
17. Id. at 1738.
18. Id. at 1735.
19. See infra Part IV for discussion on the current circuit split and where the
Dalton decision fits within that disagreement.
20. Dalton v. State, 477 P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
21. Id. at 651.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (noting that the plea deal included a stipulation that Dalton’s conduct
was among the most serious included within the definition of the offense); see also
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(10) (2020) (listing this factor as one that may be
considered by the sentencing court).
25. Dalton, 477 P.3d at 651.
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of which were suspended, as well as ten years of probation.26 The trial
court also imposed probation conditions that: (1) restricted Dalton’s
contact with the victim of his crimes and (2) prohibited Internet access
without prior approval from his probation officer.27
On appeal, Dalton challenged the constitutionality of the probation
condition prohibiting him from accessing the Internet without his
probation officer’s approval.28 He argued that the trial court had a duty
to apply special scrutiny to a condition that implicated Dalton’s First
Amendment right.29 The State countered this appeal by pointing to two
prior decisions: Dunder v. State30 and Diorec v. State.31 In Dunder, the court
reviewed a probation condition that prohibited possession of any device
that could access the Internet, store movies or photographs, or had a
wireless capability.32 Dunder’s offenses involved the use of the Internet to
commit serious sexual offenses against minors and to distribute child
pornography.33 The court disapproved of the total ban on electronics in
Dunder, and instead adopted a probation condition that limited his
possession of Internet-capable electronics and electronic storage devices
unless he obtained permission from his probation or parole officer.34 In
Diorec, the court reviewed a probation condition that prohibited “opening
an Internet account or accessing the Internet from another person’s
account without the prior written permission of his probation officer.”35
Diorec’s offenses involved impersonating a teenage boy to contact
teenage girls, including his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, and using the
Internet to buy a spy camera, which he installed in his stepdaughter’s
room.36 The court upheld the probation condition outlined in Diorec.37
In Dalton, the court noted that the role of the Internet in society had
grown significantly in the eleven years since its decision in Dunder and in
the seven years since its decision in Diorec.38 Further, the court surveyed
several other jurisdictions and found that many are no longer receptive to
total Internet and electronic bans as probation and parole conditions.39

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 651–52.
Id. at 652.
No. A-10205, 2009 WL 1607917 (Alaska Ct. App. June 10, 2009).
295 P.3d 409 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
Dunder, 2009 WL 1607917, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Diorec, 295 P.3d at 418.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 418.
Dalton v. State, 477 P.3d 650, 655 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
Id. at 653–54.
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The court pointed to the Third Circuit as an example.40 In United States v.
Holena,41 the Third Circuit recently vacated a probation condition that
prohibited an individual from possessing or using computers, or
otherwise accessing the Internet without his probation officer’s
approval.42 The Third Circuit acknowledged the role the Internet had
played in the individual’s underlying offenses, but nonetheless
concluded that the Internet restriction was overbroad and unduly
restrictive of liberty because it “gave the probation office no guidance on
the sorts of [I]nternet use that it should approve.”43
Expanding on the First Amendment considerations, the Dalton court
also discussed the burdens that Internet bans have on probationers
seeking to reintegrate into society, especially given the increasing
dependence on the Internet in the conduct of one’s daily life.44 What was
a substantial hindrance on reintegration a decade ago is now an almost
total hindrance on reintegration into modern society and would deprive
a probationer from meaningful participation in public discourse.45
However, the court decided not to overrule its two prior decisions.46
Rather, the court factually distinguished Dalton’s appeal from Dunder
and Diorec.47 Here, the court held that the Internet played a greater role in
Dunder’s distribution of child pornography and Diorec’s campaign to
exploit his stepdaughter than it did in Dalton’s viewing files on a
pornography website before the sexual assault of his stepdaughter.48
Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court that there was a
factual nexus justifying a restriction on Dalton’s Internet access.49
However, the court held that a total Internet ban, subject to the
unconstrained discretion of a probation officer, would unduly restrict
Dalton’s liberty under the First Amendment.50 The case was remanded to
the trial court with the direction that it must narrowly tailor any
restrictions it should impose on Dalton’s Internet access.51

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 653.
906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 295.
Id. at 293.
Dalton, 477 P.3d at 655.
Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
a.

The Role of the Internet

While the Internet played a disturbing role in Dalton, Dunder, and
Diorec’s crimes, the Internet can also have a crucial role in their
rehabilitation.52 Moreover, in Dalton, the court factually distinguished the
case before it from its prior decisions in Dunder and Diorec, arguing that
the Internet played a greater role in the previous cases.53 This is not
supported by the facts of the cases described above. Moreover, it is
questionable for the court to compare the “role” of the Internet in crimes
that were committed in 2009 and 2013 with a crime committed in 2017, as
the court itself notes the exponential growth and increased role of the
Internet in society during this time period.54 Instead, the court should
have looked to the Internet’s role in the crime in light of its prevalence at
the time of the crime—along with other known parole and probation
conditions that promote deterrence and rehabilitation.
b.

Circuit Split on First Amendment Issue

Although Dalton is a state court decision, it brings Alaska into the
federal debate over the preservation of First Amendment rights for
parolees. Packingham did provide some guidance for Internet restrictions,
but the holding there was limited in scope. The statute invalidated by
Packingham made it a felony for registered sex offenders to access certain
websites.55 Neither the statute nor the holding reached the issue of special
conditions of parole or supervised release. Individuals on parole or
probation have limited rights compared to citizens who are not living
52. See generally Tamara S. N. Wild et al., Web-Based Health Services in Forensic
Psychiatry: A Review of the Use of the Internet in the Treatment of Child Sexual Abusers
and Child Sexual Exploitation Material Offenders, 9 FRONT PSYCHIATRY 1, 1–2 (2018)
(noting the recent proliferation in web-based health services and providing a
meta-analysis of online treatment for child sexual abusers); Madhumita Pandey,
Rehabilitating Sex Offenders Maybe Controversial – But It Is the Need of the Hour,
SHEFFIELD INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Nov. 13, 2020)
https://sheffieldinstituteforpolicystudies.com/2020/11/13/rehabilitating-sexoffenders-maybe-controversial-but-it-is-the-need-of-the-hour/. Even though
there is no general consensus on whether offenders who commit sex crimes
against children can be rehabilitated, many psychologists point to low rates of reoffending for those who complete treatment programs and high rates of revictimization for those who do not. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed
many treatment programs and resources online.
53. Dalton, 477 P.3d at 655–56.
54. Id. at 655.
55. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017) (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(a) (2015) (amended 2019)).
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under these circumstances.56 Over time, there have been inconsistent
interpretations of Packingham and different articulations of rights for
individuals on probation or parole among the circuits.
The Third and Tenth Circuits have held that allowing a probation
officer total discretion over an individual’s Internet access is
unconstitutionally broad.57 These cases were relied upon by the state
court in Dalton.58 These circuits explicitly recognize the importance of the
Internet to participate in everyday life in America, and that restrictions on
Internet use therefore pose questions of constitutionality even when they
are ultimately found to be valid.59 Each circuit also suggests alternatives
to bans, such as monitoring programs, as potentially less restrictive
conditions.60
A majority of the circuits do not hold this view. The Eleventh Circuit,
for example, has expressly criticized the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
Packingham as too broad.61 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished
Packingham from cases involving Internet bans as conditions to parole
where the original crime was connected to the use of the Internet.62 Other
circuits are less clear on the constitutionality of Internet bans lifted only
at the discretion of a parole or probation officer. Several of the other
circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth, uphold the
general rule that when the Internet is connected to the original crime
committed, Internet bans and restrictions are constitutionally acceptable,
although the specific conditions vary from case to case.63 There is thus
general disagreement over whether Packingham applies to special
conditions for parole or supervised release, making the constitutional
question on this point blurry. The court in Dalton seems to side with the
courts that have taken a more cautious approach to First Amendment
restrictions in this context.

56. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
57. See United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that
banning Internet access entirely except for the discretionary allowance of the
probation office was an overbroad special condition); see also supra Part III for a
discussion of United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 290–95 (3d Cir. 2018).
58. Dalton, 477 P.3d at 653.
59. See Blair, 933 F.3d at 1277; Holena, 906 F.3d at 292 (“Still, internet bans are
‘draconian,’ and we have said as much ‘even in cases where we have upheld
them.’”).
60. Blair, 933 F.3d at 1278; Holena, 906 F.3d at 294.
61. United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 978 (11th Cir. 2020).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Bolin, 976 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2020); United
States v. Mixell, 806 F. App’x 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Perrin, 926
F.3d 1044, 1050 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Peterson, 776 F. App’x 533, 534
(9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2018).
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Collateral Consequences of Internet Limitations and
Reintegration

Restrictions on the use of the Internet and social media are, at their
core, a balance of policy interests for the courts that review them. On the
one hand, parole and probation are distinct from incarceration in that
only the former center around the rehabilitation of the individuals and
their reentry into society.64 At the same time, it is clear that the Internet
provides plenty of opportunities for causing harm, particularly to
vulnerable populations like minors. Thus, there is a tension present
between the goal of societal reentry and “the need to protect both the
public and sex offenders themselves from [the Internet’s] potential
abuses” when determining special conditions for probation and parole.65
However, the importance of the Internet, and the barriers to reentry
posed by the denial of access, cannot be ignored by courts. In 2019, ninety
percent of American adults had Internet service.66 In that same year,
almost three-quarters of adults used some kind of social media, making
these websites important places of personal connection.67 Social media
can also serve as a source of news and political activism, particularly for
marginalized communities.68 The Internet is even increasingly central to
one’s physical health. Internet access enables people, wherever they live,
“to communicate freely with their physicians, to access electronic medical
records, to research health conditions and treatment, or find resources for
healthy behaviors and lifestyle changes.”69 The realities of the COVID-19
pandemic have only reinforced the necessity to be able to connect
remotely. The Internet is thus a necessary tool for accessing the
information one needs to maintain relationships, be an informed citizen,
and even stay healthy.

64. Hutt, supra note 3, at 671–73.
65. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003).
66. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internetbroadband/#internet-use-over-time.
67. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
68. See Brooke Auxier, Social Media Continue to be Important Political Outlets for
Black Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/11/social-media-continueto-be-important-political-outlets-for-black-americans/ (citing data that Black
Americans use social media to engage with political issues and find like-minded
individuals at higher rates than White Americans).
69. Carmen Guerra et al., Why Internet Access is a ‘Super’ Determinant of Health,
PHILA. INQUIRER (July 7, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/health/expertopinions/internet-access-telemedicine-determinants-of-health-low-income20200707.html.
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The Internet is also central for one of the most important aspects of
reentry: seeking employment. In 2015, ninety percent of recent job seekers
looked for employment online, and eighty-four percent applied to jobs
through online applications.70 Many people also use social media to gain
informal employment tips and information about employers.71 For people
operating their own businesses, online advertising and networking are
important tools and may be attractive to people whose access to certain
job markets are restricted due to their criminal history.72 Computer access,
and access to social media, are thus undeniably critical for meaningful
participation in the present-day world. While there are fair concerns of
deterring future crimes committed on computers, the idea that people can
effectively reenter society after incarceration without access to the
Internet is an increasingly untenable position.
d.

Digital Inequality in America’s “Last Frontier”

Alaska has the worst Internet speeds and coverage in the United
States.73 For people living in one of the most remote areas in the country,
having access to fast, strong, and reliable connectivity is critical for
economic opportunity, education, and access to quality health care.
Particularly in light of the pandemic, access to a reliable and fast Internet
connection directly impacts community growth and the future success of
youth.74 Moreover, access to reliable Internet is crucial for the many
employees who now find themselves part of a virtual workforce.
Alaska faces a particularly steep challenge to widespread, equitable
Internet access. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
estimates that “less than 60% of people living on tribal lands have access
to broadband compared to 97% of Americans living in urban areas.”75 In
February 2020, the FCC created a priority window for federally
recognized Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages to claim

70. AARON SMITH, SEARCHING FOR WORK IN THE DIGITAL ERA 9 (2015).
71. Id. at 7.
72. Hutt, supra note 3, at 684–85.
73. See Tyler Cooper & Julia Tanberk, Best and Worst States for Internet
Coverage, Prices and Speeds, 2020, BROADBANDNOW RES. (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://broadbandnow.com/research/best-states-with-internet-coverage-andspeed (noting that Alaska ranks lowest in terms of Internet coverage, prices, and
speeds, “with 61% wired and fixed wireless broadband coverage and no lowpriced (wired) plan availability”).
74. Ben Fate Velaise, Alaska Native Tribes Must Act Fact to Close Digital Divide,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 8, 2020),
https://www.adn.com/opinions/2020/07/08/alaska-native-tribes-must-actfast-to-close-digital-divide/.
75. Id.
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unlicensed Educational Broadband Service spectrum.76 These licenses
promised to aid villages in establishing and expanding high-speed
Internet access at no cost to them.77
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the essential nature of
access to reliable, fast-speed Internet.78 From the ability to look up
pertinent information about the virus and preventative measures to
providing a means to connect with loved ones, access to the Internet has
become even more crucial for our society than ever. And in America’s
“Last Frontier,” Internet connectivity is now an integral part of a
customary self-reliance lifestyle. The clear need to improve connectivity
only further supports Dalton’s argument that the Internet is “the air we
all breathe.”
V. Conclusion
Access to the Internet is a right, not a privilege. As trial courts
continue to allow Internet restrictions as conditions of parole or
probation, many jurisdictions across the United States are left grappling
with how to strike a balance between the goal of deterrence and the
protection of individual rights. The Court of Appeals of Alaska weighed
into this ongoing debate in Dalton v. State, holding that a total Internet ban
that requires prior approval from a parole officer before any and all
Internet use is unconstitutionally broad. This decision broke from
established precedent, and acknowledged that the Internet has become
indispensable to living in and successfully reentering society today. It will
be interesting to see if other courts follow this lead regarding special
conditions.

76. 2.5 GHz Rural Tribal Window, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/25-ghz-rural-tribal-window (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
77. Id.
78. Emily A. Vogels et al., 53% of Americans Say the Internet Has been Essential
During the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/04/30/53-of-americans-say-theinternet-has-been-essential-during-the-covid-19-outbreak/.

